Unconditionally secure non-relativistic bit commitment is known to be impossible in both the classical and quantum worlds. However, when committing to a string of n bits at once, how far can we stretch the quantum limits? We consider quantum schemes where Alice commits a string of n bits to Bob, in such a way that she can only cheat on a bits and Bob can learn at most b bits of "information" before the reveal phase. We show a negative and a positive result, depending on how we measure Bob's information. If we use the Holevo quantity, no good schemes exist: a + b is at least n. If, however, we use accessible information, there exists a scheme where a = 4 log n + O(1) and b = 4. This is classically impossible. Our protocol is not efficient, however, we also exhibit an efficient scheme when Bob's measurement circuit is restricted to polynomial size. Our scheme also implies a protocol for n simultaneous coin flips which achieves higher entropy of the resulting string than any previously known protocol.
Introduction
Commitments play an important role in modern day cryptography. Informally, a commitment allows one party to prove that she has made up her mind and cannot change it, while hiding the actual decision until later. Imagine the following scenario, known as bit commitment: the committer (Alice) chooses a bit x and tells the receiver (Bob) that she has made her choice. Since Bob is inherently mistrustful, Alice jots down x on a piece of paper and puts it in a safe she hands over to Bob. With the safe in his possession, Bob is satisfied that Alice has indeed picked an x and cannot change her mind later. Likewise, Alice is confident that Bob cannot open the safe and read x. At a later time, Alice decides to reveal her choice of x. She then hands the key of the safe to Bob, who can check if its contents indeed correspond to x.
Bit commitment is a very powerful cryptographic primitive, with a wide range of applications. It has been shown that quantum oblivous transfer (QOT) [5] can be achieved provided there exists a secure bit commitment scheme [47, 14] . In turn, oblivious transfer is known to be sufficient for solving the general problem of secure two-party computation [17, 32] . Commitments are also useful for constructing zero-knowledge proofs [23] . Furthermore, a bit commitment protocol can be used to implement secure coin tossing [6] . Classically, unconditionally secure bit commitment is known to be impossible. Unfortunately after several quantum schemes were suggested [4, 7, 8] , nonrelativistic quantum bit commitment has also been shown to be impossible [36, 33, 37, 34, 9, 11] . Only very limited degrees of concealment and bindingness can be achieved [43] . In the face of these negative statements, what can we still hope to achieve?
String Commitment
Here we take a different approach and look at the task of committing to a string of n bits at once, when the adversary is unbounded. Since perfect bit commitment is impossible, perfect string commitment is impossible, too. However, is it possible to design meaningful string commitment schemes when we allow for a small ability to cheat on both Alice's and Bob's side? To make this question precise, we introduce a framework for the classification of string commitments in terms of the length n of the string, Alice's ability to cheat on a bits and Bob's ability to acquire b bits of information before the reveal phase. Instead of asking for a perfectly binding commitment, we allow Alice to reveal up to 2 a strings successfully: Bob will accept any such string as a valid opening of the commitment. Formally, we demand that x∈{0,1} npx ≤ 2 a , wherep x is the probability that Alice successfully reveals string x during the reveal phase. Contrary to classical computing, Alice can always choose to perform a superposition of string commitments without Bob's knowledge. Thus even for a perfectly binding string commitment we would only demand x∈{0,1} npx ≤ 1, since a strategy based on superpositions is indistinguishable from the "classical" honest behaviour of choosing a string beforehand and then committing to it. At the same time, we relax the concealing condition. Here, we demand that the amount of information Bob can obtain about the string is upper bounded by a parameter b. The definition of "information" is crucial to our investigation. We first consider quantum information: the Holevo χ quantity. The χ quantity is also used as a security criteria by Kent [31] and is equal to the Shannon entropy if the system is purely classical. Secondly, we consider the classical information in terms of the accessible information I acc , which quantifies the amount of classical information that Bob can gain before the reveal phase by performing a measurement. Finally, we take I k acc , a computationally bounded version thereof. We use B to denote the relevant quantity which measures the amount of information and (n, a, b)-B-QSC to denote a quantum string commitment scheme parameterized in the described fashion. Our first contribution is to show that string commitment schemes where the amount of information Bob obtains is measured in terms of χ are insecure. We show in Section 4 Impossibility of (n, a, b)-χ-QSC: Every (n, a, b)-χ-QSC scheme with a + b < n is insecure when executed a sufficiently large number of times in parallel.
Our proof makes use of privacy amplification with two-universal hash functions. If the protocol is executed only once, we prove a similar statement for a + b + c < n, where c is a small constant. We refer to these results as "impossibilities", as they show that QSCs offer almost no advantage over the trivial classical protocol: Alice first sends b bits of the n bit string to Bob during the commit phase, and then supplies him with the remaining n − b bits in the reveal phase.
The second part of the paper is devoted to the "possibility" of QSC. If we weaken our standard of security and measure Bob's information gain in terms of the accessible information, it becomes possible to construct meaningful QSC protocols with a = 4 log n + O(1) and b = 4. Our protocols are based on the effect of locking classical information in quantum states [19] . This surprising effect shows that given an initial shared quantum state, the transmission of ℓ classical bits can increase the total amount of correlation by more than ℓ bits. In Section 5, we show Possibility of (n, a, b)-I acc -QSC: For n ≥ 3, there exist (n, 4 log n + O(1), 4)-I acc -QSC protocols.
We derive this result by application and improvement of a calculation in [25] . Our result therefore also improves a previous bound on the strength of the locking effect. Intuitively, the reason why there exist meaningful protocols for the case B = I acc , is that χ merely forms an upper bound on I acc . This bound is by no means tight and the gap can be arbitrarily large. We do therefore not contradict our impossibility result. In the case of string commitment, χ sometimes still vastly overestimates the amount of classical information Bob can extract from the commitment. The exploitation of this difference is central to our work.
Our aforementioned impossibility and possibility results are in the model of unconditional security. Whereas our previous possibility result is inefficient, we now show that there is an efficient protocol if we restrict Bob's measurement circuit to poly(n) size. In this efficient protocol the accessible information is still upper bounded by a constant, while Alice still cannot cheat much. We introduce I k acc to denote Bob's accessible information if his quantum circuit is limited to size n k . Note that this is the weakest possible computational assumption one can impose on Bob. We do not require that certain computational problems are hard in polynomial time, e.g. like the existence of one-way functions, but merely assume that Bob runs in polynomial time. As we prove in Section 5.3, Possibility of (n, a, b)-I k acc -QSC: There exists an efficient (n, (k + 2) log n + 3, 2)-I k acc -QSC scheme. Our proof implies a novel result for locking correlations in quantum states, which has not been previously considered under the assumption of restricted circuits. In particular, we show the existence of a locking protocol where Bob's accessible information is upper bounded by I k acc ≤ 2, which jumps to I k acc = n once Alice sends an additional (k + 2) log n + 3 bits of classical information to Bob.
String Flipping
Bit commitment can be used to implement coin flipping. The goal of coin flipping is to generate randomness between two mutually distrustful parties, Alice and Bob [6] . Flipping n coins at once is also known as string flipping. Quantum string flipping has previously been considered by Barrett and Massar [3] and Kent [30] . Let C denote the random variable which determines the outcome of the string flip, and let H A (C) and H B (C) denote the entropy of the string if Alice or Bob, respectively, are dishonest. Barrett and Massar proved that for their protocols min(H A , H B ) ≥ n − O(n 7/8 (log n) 1/8 ). In Section 6 we improve this bound and show how to construct quantum string flipping protocols on the basis of a (n, a, b)-I acc -QSC, where in case of a dishonest Alice the min-entropy of the string obeys H A ∞ (C) ≥ n − a and in the case of dishonest Bob H B (C) ≥ n − b. Based on the possibility results for QSC commitment we obtain:
Quantum String Flipping:
There exist string flipping protocols of length n with H A ∞ (C) ≥ n − 4 log n + O(1) and
Since H A (C) ≥ H A ∞ (C), these are the best known entropy properties to date.
Related Work
To obtain bit commitment, different restrictions have been introduced into the model. Salvail [41] showed that, for any fixed n, secure bit commitment is possible provided that the sender is not able to perform generalized measurements on more then n qubits coherently. Large n coherent measurements are not yet feasible, so his result provides an implementation which is secure under a plausible technological assumption. DiVincenzo, Smolin and Terhal took a different approach [21] , showing that if the bit commitment is forced to be ancilla-free, a type of asymptotic security is still possible. Classically, introducing restrictions can also open new possibilities. Cachin, Crépeau and Marcil have shown how to implement bit commitment via oblivious transfer under the assumption that the size of the receiver's memory is bounded [10] . Furthermore, the assumption of a noisy channel can be sufficient for oblivious transfer [16, 45] . A new cryptographic task-called cheatsensitive bit commitment-has been studied by Hardy and Kent [24] , as well as Aharanov, TaShma, Vazirani and Yao [1] : no restrictions are placed on the adversary initially, but an honest party should stand a good chance of catching a cheater. Kent also showed that bit commitment can be achieved using relativistic constraints [29] . Classically, string commitment is directly linked to bit commitment and no interesting protocols are possible. Kent [31] first asked what kind of quantum string commitment (QSC) can be achieved. He gave a protocol under the restrictive assumption that Alice does not commit to a superposition [28] . His protocol was modified for experimental purposes by Tsurumaru [44] . Crépeau, Dumais, Mayers and Salvail [15] consider the case of computationally binding and unconditionally concealing string commitment. On the contrary, we consider an unbounded adversary.
Preliminaries
We will use I to denote the identity transformation and ⊕ to denote addition modulo 2. For x, y ∈ {0, 1} n , x ⊕ y is taken bitwise.
Quantum Computing
We assume familiarity with the quantum model [38] and only briefly introduce the most important notions: An n-dimensional pure quantum state is a vector |ψ ∈ C n with norm 1. A mixed state is a classical probability distribution {p i , |ψ i } with 0 ≤ p i ≤ 1, i p i = 1 over pure states |ψ i . Such a mixed state can be written as a density operator ρ = i p i |ψ i ψ i | of an ensemble {p i , |ψ i }. ρ is a positive operator with trace 1. A unitary transformation U applied to a system in state ρ results in the state U ρU † . Suppose Alice and Bob's joint quantum system is described by ρ AB . Then the reduced density operator describing Bob's system is given as ρ B = Tr A (ρ AB ), where Tr A denotes the partial trace over Alice's system. We also say that we "trace out" Alice's system when considering ρ B alone. For a mixed state ρ, any pure state |ψ of a larger system that gives ρ when we trace out part of this system is called a purification of ρ. The trace distance between two density operators ρ 0 and ρ 1 is a metric on the operator space and is defined as δ(ρ 0 , ρ 1 ) := Tr(|ρ 0 − ρ 1 |)/2, where |A| := √ A † A is the positive square root of A † A. The fidelity measures the overlap of ρ 0 and ρ 1 and is given by F (ρ 0 , ρ 1 ) := max |ψ 0 ,|ψ 1 | ψ 0 |ψ 1 | 2 , where the maximization is taken over all purifications |ψ 0 and |ψ 1 of ρ 0 and ρ 1 .
Privacy Amplification
An important ingredient in the impossibility proof is privacy amplification with two universal hash functions. Let G denote a class of functions with domain X and range Y. G is called two-universal if for any distinct x, x ′ ∈ X , Pr g∈G [g(x) = g(x ′ )] ≤ 1/|Y|. In particular, the class of all functions from X to Y is two-universal [39] . For privacy amplification, we need to introduce Rényi entropies. For a quantum state ρ, we define the Rényi entropy of order α to be S α (ρ) = (log Trρ α )/(1 − α). The values {0, 1, ∞} of α are defined by taking the appropriate limit. In particular, S 0 (ρ) = log rank ρ and S 1 (ρ) = S(ρ), where S(ρ) = − i λ i log λ i is the von Neumann entropy of ρ where λ i is the i-th eigenvalue of ρ. And S ∞ (ρ) = − log λ max with λ max being the largest eigenvalue of ρ. We will make use of the following definition of security [39] , Definition 1 Let X be a random variable with events denoted by x, a probability distribution P X (x) = p x and range {0, 1} n . Define the non-uniformity of X with respect to
Informally, this means that the key X used in the real case x p x |x x| ⊗ ρ x will be very close to a key used in an ideal scenario of I/2 n ⊗ ρ, where instead of X we have a perfect key which is uniformly distributed and independent of E. We are now able to state a theorem, which will play a significant role in our impossibility result. [39] ) Let E = {p x , ρ x } be an ensemble of quantum states with ρ = x p x ρ x . Here, X is a random variable with range {0, 1} n . Furthermore, let G be a class of two-universal hash functions from X = {0, 1} n to Y = {0, 1} s . Application of a hash function g ∈ G to X naturally leads to an ensemble E g = {q 
Theorem 1 (Renner and König
:= x∈g −1 (y) p x ρ x . Then 1 |G| g∈G d(E g ) ≤ 1 2 2 − 1 2 [S 2 ( x px|x x|⊗ρx)−S 0 (ρ)−s] .
Definition 2 The Holevo χ quantity (or Holevo information) of an ensemble
We introduce a one-shot analogue Ξ of the Holevo information:
We will also need the notion of accessible information and mutually unbiased bases. In any dimension d, the number of mutually unbiased bases is at most d + 1 [2] . Explicit constructions are known if d is a prime power [2] , [46] .
Framework for Quantum String Commitment (QSC)
Unlike classical commitment schemes, quantum protocols always allow Alice to commit to a superposition of strings. Her choice is then made randomly from all elements in the superposition later on. Since this strategy is indistinguishable from first choosing a string at random and then committing to it, our definition of quantum string commitment should allow for it. • (Concealing) Bob's information at the end of the commit phase measured in terms of B no larger than b: B(E) ≤ b.
• (Binding) x∈{0,1} npx ≤ 2 a wherep x is the probability that Alice is able to successfully reveal x ∈ {0, 1} n at the reveal stage.
We also say that an (n, a, b)-B-QSC protocol is a QSC which is a-binding and b-B-concealing.
Here, we assume a uniform distribution over all strings, i.e. ∀x, p x = 1/2 n . Our results can be generalized in an appropriate sense to other distributions. Note that perfect security against Alice corresponds to the requirement a = 0. Also note that Ξ(E) ≥ χ(E) ≥ I acc (E). Hence, every (n, a, b)-Ξ-QSC-protocol is an (n, a, b)-χ-QSC protocol and every (n, a, b)-χ-protocol is an (n, a, b)-I acc -QSC protocol. The notion of b-Ξ-concealing is relevant when the protocol is executed once, whereas the notion of χ is relevant when the protocols is executed multiple times (either sequentially or in parallel). To gain some intuition, note that the "trivial protocol" in which Alice sends the first b bits of the n bit string and reveals the remaining n − b bits is an (n, n − b, b)-Ξ-QSC.
Impossibility of Holevo Information QSCs
We first show that any quantum string commitment scheme which uses B = Ξ or B = χ is very restricted. For our proof we need to make use of the general model of two-party quantum protocols given by Yao [47] and simplified by Lo and Chau [33] . Any two-party quantum protocol can be regarded as a pair of quantum machines interacting through a quantum channel. Here, the committer Alice (A) and the receiver Bob (B) are each in control of one of these machines and communicate over channel C. Without loss of generality, we assume that each machine is initially in a specified pure state. Consider the product of three Hilbert spaces H A , H B and H C representing the Hilbert spaces of Alice's and Bob's machines and the channel, respectively. During the course of the protocol Alice and Bob will perform a number of rounds of communication over the channel. Each such round can be modeled as a unitary transformation on H D ⊗ H C with D ∈ {A, B}, which induces a unitary transformation on the space H A ⊗ H B ⊗ H C . The set of possible unitary transformations used in the protocol is known to the public beforehand. We also assume that H A , H B and H C have bounded dimensions. As in [33] , we assume that Alice and Bob are in possession of both a quantum computer and a quantum storage device. This enables them in particular to add an ancilla to the quantum machine and use reversible unitary operations to replace measurement. The state of this ancilla can then be read off only at the end of the protocol. Finally, any classical computation or communication that may occur during the protocol can be simulated by a quantum computer. Thus any two-party quantum protocol such as a QSC can be described in this model. In our proof, we will need the following observation first used in the context of the no-go results for quantum bit commitment [33] . Suppose ρ 0 and ρ 1 are density operators on Bob's system, which correspond to a commitment of a "0" or a "1" respectively. Let |ψ 0 and |ψ 1 be the corresponding purifications on the joint system of Alice and Bob. When ρ 0 = ρ 1 there is a local unitary transformation U that Alice can apply to her part of the system such that |φ 1 = I ⊗ U |φ 0 . This enables Alice to change Bob's state from |φ 0 to |φ 1 and thereby break the bit commitment. This observation holds also in an approximate sense and is central to the following lemma implicit in Mayers [37] . Our impossibility proof also makes use of privacy amplification via two-universal hash functions. In particular, we will need Theorem 1 and the following two lemmas which we prove in the appendix. We assume a uniform distribution over all strings.
Lemma 3 If X is an ǫ-secure secret key with respect to E = {p x , ρ x } (and of size n), then the following hold:
2. X is 2ǫ-secure with respect to ρ, i.e.
Theorem 2 Every (n, a, b)-Ξ-QSC scheme with a + b + 5 log(2 + 4 √ 2) − 1 < n is insecure.
Proof. We will assume that Bob's one-shot Holevo information after the commit phase is upper bounded by b, i.e. Ξ(E) ≤ b. His ensemble E is defined in the case where both Alice and Bob are honest: Alice has committed to a value x and we denote the joint state of the system Alice-BobChannel H A ⊗ H B ⊗ H C after commit phase by |φ x for an input state |x . Bob's reduced density matrix will be denoted by ρ x and his ensemble becomes E = {p x , ρ x }. Assuming that Bob is honest, we will give a cheating strategy for Alice in the case where a + b + 5 log(2 + 4 √ 2) − 1 < n. The strategy will depend on the function g : X := {0, 1} n → Y := {0, 1} n−m chosen from a set G of two-universal hash functions. Alice picks a y ∈ Y and constructs the state ( x∈g −1 (y) |x |x )/ |g −1 (y)|. She then gives the second half of this state as input to the protocol and stays honest for the rest of the commit phase. The joint state of Alice and Bob at the end of the commit phase is thus clearly |ψ 
where ε = (m−b) . Note that it follows from Eq. 2 that there exists at least one g such that d(E g ) ≤ ε, hence there exists a hash function g ∈ G such that Y is an ε-secure secret key with respect to E g , the latter being Bob's information about Y . Let us now fix this g for the remainder of the proof. As we will show, this g leads to a successful attack by Alice. Lemma 3 shows that 
Clearly, the probability to reveal some x in g −1 (y) given |ψ g y is at least one. 1 Thus the probability to reveal y given |ψ g y successfully is one. Letp x andq g y denote the probabilities to successfully reveal x and y respectively andp g x|y be the conditional probability to successfully reveal x, given the successful the revelation of y. We have xp x = yq 
Recall that Alice can transform |ψ y by using only local transformations on her part. The probability to reveal y successfully, given that the state after the commit phase was |ψ y 0 can be estimated with Mayer's lemma (Lemma 1). We
where the first inequality comes from Lemma 1 with ε ′ = 0 and the second from Jensen's inequality and the concavity of the square root function. The third inequality follows from the triangle inequality and the fourth stems from Eqs. (3) and (4) . Recall that to be secure against Alice, we require 2 a ≥ 2 n−m (1−4 √ 2 √ ε). For γ ≥ 4 log(2+4 √ 2)) and m = b+γ, this gives a ≥ n−b−5/4γ+1. Hence, for γ = 4 log(2 + 4 √ 2): a + b + 5 log(2 + 4 √ 2) − 1 ≥ n, which proves the assertion. 2 Our results can easily be generalized to other distributions as long as n ≤ H 2 (X). For multiple parallel executions, the relevant quantity is Holevo χ. As we show in the appendix,
Corollary 1 Every (n, a, b)-χ-QSC scheme with a + b < n is insecure when executed a sufficiently large number of times in parallel.
Thus we have shown that a (n, a, b)-χ-QSC and (n, a, b)-Ξ-QSC offer almost no advantage over the trivial classical protocol where Alice sends b bits of her string to Bob during the commit phase.
Possibility of Accessible Information QSCs

A Class of One-Round Commit-Phase Protocols
We now turn to protocols that require a security against Bob quantified by the accessible information. By Holevo's theorem, this definition of security is weaker. Focusing on the new definition leads to a remarkable class of protocols, based on the idea of locking classical correlations in quantum states [19] . The idea explored in [19] , and subsequently in [25] , is that a quantum state shared between Alice and Bob can have very low accessible information, but that allowing them to coordinate their measurements using a very small amount of communication can radically boost the accessible information. Strategies for locking can be re-interpreted as QSC protocols.
Protocol 1: LOCKCOM(n, U)
1: Commit phase: Alice randomly chooses the string x ∈ {0, 1} n and a unitary U i from a set of unitaries U known to both Alice and Bob. She sends the state U i |x .
2:
Reveal phase: Alice announces i and x. Bob applies U † i and performs a measurement in the computational basis to obtain x ′ . He accepts iff x ′ = x.
Lemma 4 Any LOCKCOM(n, U) protocol is log(|U |)-binding, i.e. 2 a ≤ |U |,
as shown in the appendix. When B = I acc , this class of protocols yields values for the parameter b that would be forbidden by Theorem 2 for B = Ξ and by Corollary 1 for B = χ. Intuitively, the reason this is possible is that Ξ and χ sometimes vastly overestimate the amount of classical information Bob can extract. Even when these measures are high, by choosing a set of bases U that are pairwise sufficiently complementary, it becomes possible to ensure that all possible Bob measurements of his state reveal very little information for almost all of the bases in U.
Protocols against a Computationally Unbounded Receiver
Theorem 3 LOCKCOM(n, 1, n/2) using U = {I ⊗n , H ⊗n } is a (n, 1, n/2)-I acc -QSC protocol.
Proof. Lemma 4 and the fact that for Bob I acc ≤ n/2 [19] , [12] complete the proof.
2
Determining the strength of a QSC for larger sets of bases seems to be a difficult problem. The task is related to finding a good lower bound on the sum of the measurement entropies corresponding to measuring an arbitrary state in each of the different bases, a bound known as an entropic uncertainty relation [18] . Unfortunately, bounds good enough for our purposes are only known for the cases of |U | = 2 [35] and |U | = d + 1 [42] bases, where d is the dimension of Bob's Hilbert space. . We use a result from [25] which shows the existence of small sets of random unitaries that achieve a strong locking effect. Theorem V.1 of [25] can be re-interpreted in the language of QSC:
Theorem 4 Let ε > 0 and choose n, such that n > C ε log 20 ε where C > 0 is a constant. There exist (n, 3 log n, (ε/2)n + 3)-I acc -QSC protocols.
For our purpose, we can achieve the following improvement, as shown in the appendix:
Theorem 5 For n ≥ 3, there exist (n, 4 log n + O(1), 4)-I acc -QSC protocols.
To run the protocol, Alice chooses a set of n 4 unitaries independently according to the Haar measure and announces the resulting set U to Bob. They then perform LOCKCOM(n, U). Our analysis shows that this variant is secure against Bob with high probability.
An Efficient Protocol against a Computationally Bounded Receiver
Unfortunately, the implementation of the protocol involving a random choice of unitary matrices as derived in the previous section is inefficient. The natural candidate for an efficient protocol would use a set of mutually unbiased bases and would thus be a direct extension of Theorem 3. We were not able to prove this result against a computationally unbounded receiver. However, we achieved a restricted result when restricting Bob's cheating powers by limiting the size of his quantum circuit to poly(n). This gives 2 poly(n) , an upper bound on the number of POVM's that can be implemented with polynomial size quantum circuits on an input of n qubits. In analogy to Definition 5 we define: 
Theorem 6
There exists a (n, (k + 2) log n + 3, 2)-I k acc -QSC scheme that can be efficiently implemented.
As we show in the appendix, a simple modification of our protocol leads to this powerful QSC. Our proof gives an explicit construction: Alice first chooses (k + 2) log n + 3 bases at random from the set of d + 1 mutually unbiased basis and informs Bob about her choice. They then perform LOCKCOM using the chosen bases. Bob's accessible information is upper bounded by a constant. We believe that the same can be shown if Bob's circuit is unrestricted.
Optimality and Composability
We consider optimality in the case where there is no restriction on the size of Bob's circuits. Since Bob can guess the a bits of reveal information correctly with probability 1/2 a and then extract the n-bit commitment, his accessible information will be at least I acc ≥ n/2 a [19] . For a QSC to be optimal, we would like guessing to be Bob's best strategy: I acc = n/2 a . Our (n, 1, n/2)-I acc -QSC is thus optimal. Numerical simulations of [19] seem to suggest a larger set of MUBs does not lead to an optimal QSC. Nevertheless, these simulations make use of entropic uncertainty relations and other means of obtaining a bound could be explored. It thus remains to close the gap between this lower bound and MUB based protocols for a > 1. The protocols constructed in Theorem 5 use n 4 bases and achieve b = O(1). It follows from the above discussion that a polynomial number of bases is indeed needed to achieve b = O(1). More precisely,
In particular, there is no protocol with a sublinear number of bases and constant
We will not prove universal composability, but only show that our protocols can be safely executed an arbitrary number of times in parallel. Clearly, the security parameter for Alice grows linearly with the number of executions. It is immediate that Ξ as well as χ are additive. It was also observed by Holevo [26] (and [22] ) that the accessible information I acc from m independent draws of an ensemble E of separable state is additive [20] : I acc (E ⊗n ) = mI acc (E). Hence, Bob's security parameter becomes b ′ = bm. The additivity of I k acc in the cases considered can easily be seen.
Quantum String Flipping (QSF)
Perfect coin flipping is impossible using a classical or quantum communication paradigm. However, we show how to use the QSC protocols from the previous section to generate n simultaneous coin flips or a string flip with interesting new entropy properties. Owing to a lemma by [27] connecting the min-entropy of a string to the amount of extractable randomness, it is desirable that a good string flipping protocol enables the parties to flip a string with high min-entropy. We first give a definition of string flipping that depends on the choice of a Rényi entropy of a certain order. • If Alice is dishonest, H A ra (C) ≥ n − a. Superscript A denotes the fact that Alice is dishonest.
•
In the following, we will pay particular attention to protocols for which r a = ∞ and r b = 1.
Protocol 2: STRINGFLIP(n, a, b)
1: Alice picks x ∈ R {0, 1} n uniformly at random. Alice and Bob perform the commit step of a (n, a, b)-I acc -QSC protocol, where Alice's input is x.
2: Bob picks y ∈ R {0, 1} n uniformly at random and sends y to Alice.
3: Alice opens the commitment, i.e. the string x, and they define c = x ⊕ y.
To understand why we can't bound H ∞ in both cases, note that for cheating Bob the string has H B ∞ (C) ≤ a since he can guess the correct reveal information with probability 1/2 a and in this case bias the string at will. The entropic properties of the strings generated with STRINGFLIP can be summarized as:
Corollary 2 There exist QSF protocols with H
This improves the protocols of [3] , for which min(
Open Questions
We have shown that privacy amplification can be applied to obtain no-go theorems for quantum communication tasks. This technique bears the potential for extension and might be applied to obtain novel no-go theorems for other cryptographic tasks such as secure function evaluation. We also constructed quantum string commitment protocols based on accessible information. Our construction thereby relies on a randomizing technique. It thus remains to decide whether an efficient construction exits which is secure against an unbounded adversary. Finally, our QSC schemes imply a protocol for n simultaneous coin flips which achieve higher entropy of the resulting string than any previously known protocol. We leave the question open to determine the optimality of the scheme and to find bounds on string flipping schemes in general.
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3. Using the triangle inequality, the assumption and part 2 of this lemma we obtain
In order to proof our result for the case of multiple parallel executions, it will prove useful to introduce a smoothed version of Rényi entropy [40] . The ǫ-smooth Rényi entropy of order α of ρ is given by S 
Corollary 1 Every (n, a, b)-χ-QSC scheme with a + b < n is insecure when executed a sufficiently large number of times in parallel.
Proof. Lemma A.1 implies
The assertion then follows from Corollary A.1 and the proof of Theorem 2. Proof. Letp x denote the probability that Alice reveals x successfully. Then,p x ≤ rp x,r , wherẽ p x,r is the probability that x is accepted by Bob when the reveal information was r. Let ρ denote the state of Bob's system. Summation over x yields Proof. Let U ran denote the set of m randomly chosen bases and consider the LOCKCOM(n, a, b) scheme using unitaries U = U ran . Security against Alice is again given by Lemma 4. We now need to show that this choice of unitaries achieves the desired locking effect and thus security against Bob. Again, let d = 2 n denote the dimension. It was observed in [19] that
where X j denotes the outcome of the measurement of |φ in basis j and the maximum is taken over all pure states |φ . According to [25, Appendix B] there is a constant C ′ > 0 such that 
where the inequality follows from the concavity of the entropy function. Next, recall the entropic uncertainty relation of Sanchez [42] , which asserts that for all states |ψ ,
H q(x|ψ, V ) ≥ log(d + 1) − 1.
This implies that the accessible information is small if the full set V M U B of mutually unbiased bases is used. To control Eq. 7, which uses the smaller set U, we can use a convergence estimate. In particular, if the unitaries in U are selected independently from the uniform distribution on V M U B , then the Chernoff bound applies and Setting ǫ = 1/n, we find that the probability bound is less than 2 −n k if m ≥ 7n k+2 . Thus, with probability at least 1 − 2 −n k with respect to Alice's random selection of U, we get I k acc < 2. Averaging implies I k acc < 2 overall. 2
C Proofs from Section 6
Theorem 8 Any STRINGFLIP(n, a, b) is an (n, a ∞ , b 1 )-QSF protocol.
Proof. Assume that Bob is honest and let p(c) be the probability that string c is flipped. To maximize the probability p(c), Alice must "counteract" the string that she obtains from Bob: The second equality follows since Bob is honest and the last inequality comes from the assumption that Alice is a-bound.
Consider now the case of honest Alice. 
The last inequality follows from the assumption that Bob's accessible information with Alice's string is upper bounded by b. 2
